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INTRODUCTION 
After a number of heady false starts, against the backdrop of threatened 
financial catastrophe, Congress and the White House enacted a stopgap fi-
nancial “bailout” plan early in October 2008.1  The so-called “Troubled 
Asset Relief Plan” (“TARP,” “the Plan”) is remarkable in a multitude of 
respects.  As a fiscal matter, the Plan’s sheer size—$700 billion, with no 
assurance that this will be all—appears to be unprecedented.  It dwarfs 
even the costs of the savings and loan (“S&L”) cleanup nearly two decades 
ago, remarkable as those were in their own day.  As a legal matter, the 
sheer breadth of barely reviewable discretion that the TARP confers upon 
the Treasury presses hard against Constitutional limits on Executive Branch 
authority.  Indeed, lawyers largely agreed that the original, three-page ver-
sion of the Plan might well have delegated authority in excess of what the 
Constitution permits, while the amended, 400-page version squeaks by at 
best.2 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University.  Thanks to Chris Barrett, Kaushik Basu, 
Neil Buchanan, Mike Dorf, Bob Frank, George Hay, Jeff Madrick, Maureen O’Hara, John 
Roemer, and Bob Shiller for helpful discussions and suggestions. 
 1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Bailout Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23sorkin.html; Post-
ing of Eric Posner to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_ 
09_14-2008_09_20.shtml#1221830018 (Sept. 19, 2008, 10:13 EST); Posting of Eric Posner 
to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_09_14-2008_09_20 
.shtml#1221958868 (Sept. 20, 2008, 22:01 EST); Posting of Lawrence R. Velvel to Com-
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At least as striking as the TARP’s fiscal scale and delegated executive 
scope, however, has been the remarkably restless character of the Treas-
ury’s actions taken under the Plan since its enactment.  Messrs. Bernanke, 
Bush, and Paulson originally projected the TARP, late in September 2008, 
as a proposed “buy-up” of mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”) said to be 
clogging the credit markets.3  The Treasury next began speaking instead, 
about mid-October 2008, of “buying-in” to financial institutions.4  This, it 
was said, would make lendable funds more immediately available to lend-
ers, hence restoring liquidity to credit markets more expeditiously.5 
By early November, the Treasury was reporting that the buy-in plan 
would entirely supplant the earlier buy-up plan.6  About mid-November, 
however, the Treasury abruptly announced it would enter the short-term 
debt markets as well, once again “buying-up,” in order to get commercial 
paper circulating again.7  Then, near the end of November, the Plan 
changed again: now, we were told, the Treasury would resume purchasing 
“toxic” assets, but more kinds than MBSs.8  Finally, in early December, 
talk had turned toward employing some of the TARP monies to tide over 
automakers as well, a course of action that indeed began by the new year.9 
Throughout all of the on-a-dime pivots and changes of direction, a few 
voices softer than the Treasury’s have been offering proposals aimed at the 
primary cause of our present financial worries—the ongoing mortgage 
 
mondreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2008/09/19-0 (Sept. 19, 2008); Post-
ing of David Zaring to The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/09/the-
bailout-sta.html (Sept. 20, 2008). 
 3. Turmoil in US Credit Markets:  Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored 
Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (tes-
timony of Henry J. Paulson Jr., Secretary of the United States Treasury), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/PAULSONTestimony92308.pdf. 
 4. Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, White House Overhauling Rescue Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. More on Henry Paulson’s Bailout Update, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/ 
11/12/henry-paulsons-bailout-update/?scp=44&sq=troubled%20asset%20relief%20&%20 
novmber%202008&st=cse (Nov. 12, 2008, 11:15 EST). 
 7. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Shifts Focus in Credit Bailout to Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2008, at A1. 
 8. Alan S. Blinder, Missing the Target with $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at 
BU4; Jeff Zeleny, Obama and Bush Working to Calm Volatile Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
24, 2008, at A1. 
 9. See Posting of Steven M. Davidoff to Dealbook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/12/09/the-new-auto-bailout-bill/?scp=7&sq=automobile%20manufacturers%20bailout 
&st=cse (Dec. 9, 2008, 9:56 EST). 
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foreclosure crisis afflicting our post-bubble real estate markets.10  With 
time and continued tumult, these proposals have gradually come to be more 
widely heard.  Sheila Bair, Republican Chair of the FDIC, can be added to 
the list of those arguing that mortgage foreclosures lie at the core of our 
woes—a list that since autumn has included not only progressive housing 
advocates, but also financiers and economists as ideologically diverse as 
the Democrats George Soros and Joseph Stiglitz, and the Republican Glenn 
Hubbard.11  Even former Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke and former 
Treasury Secretary Paulson acknowledged the need to stabilize freefalling 
mortgage markets. 
It is very good news that so many, at last, are now looking to stemming 
the foreclosure crisis as the best means of addressing the present financial 
crisis.  However necessary the “transfusion” supplied by the first half of the 
Treasury’s new $700 billion was to keep the “patients” that are our national 
and global financial systems alive on the table, the fact is that these pa-
tients—and the public fisc—will continue to hemorrhage until we stanch 
the flow of foreclosures that is still underway.  The only real question is 
how best to do that. 
A brief bit of forgotten institutional history, I believe, supplies our an-
swer: the most effective—as well as the most constitutionally sound—way 
to solve the mortgage crisis, and thereby a looming national and indeed 
global financial crisis as well, is to direct the new Treasury under the 
Obama Administration and Secretary Geithner to administer the TARP 
through twinned institutions we already have.  These originally were, and 
still are established precisely to deal efficiently with low-end mortgage fi-
nancing and refinancing.12  Indeed, they were founded to do so precisely to 
deal with that real estate crisis which immediately preceded (one shudders 
to say it) a certain notorious Wall Street contraction—one that commenced 
in October of 1929.  Our present woes, moreover, stem directly from intru-
sions upon these institutions’ original missions by under-regulated private 
 
 10. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard & Chris Mayer, First, Let’s Stabilize Home Prices, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1222910769 
83796813.html; Posting of Robert Hockett to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/ 
2008/09/treasurys-planned-bailout-is-fhas.html (Sept. 25, 2008, 14:33 EST); Democracy 
Now!, Noble Laureate Joseph Stiglitz:  Bailout Wall Street Now, Change Terms Later, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2008/10/2/nobel_laureate_joseph_stiglitz_bailout_wall (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2009); Democracy Now!, Bridge Loan to Nowhere, http://www 
.democracynow.org/2008/9/30/bridge_loan_to_nowhere_house_rejects (last visited Feb. 22, 
2009). 
 11. See supra note 10; see also Blinder, supra note 8. 
 12. See generally Robert C. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means:  
Values, Constraints & Finance in an Authentic American Ownership Society, 79 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 45 (2006). 
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firms, first in the lead up to, then during, the near-decade-long housing 
bubble that grew from the late 1990s to about 2006. 
The institutions to which I am referring are the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration (“FHA”), working in tandem with its originally government-
sponsored and recently re-federalized sibling enterprises (“GSEs”), Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.  Any properly focused plan for financial bailout will 
critically involve what amounts to these institutions’ original, and now re-
cently restored, bailiwick.  To show why and how this is so, Part I briefly 
reviews the cause of the problems with which we are presently dealing.  
Part II then briefly reprises the founding and functioning of our newly re-
stored team of mortgage finance institutions.  Part III closes with a sketch 
of how TARP should now be channeled through these institutions. 
I.  WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE 
Let us begin by noting that there are two salient components of the pre-
sent crisis.  The first, what I’ll call “core” component, is the doubtful value 
of an uncertain number of “subprime,” “Alt-A,” and “jumbo ARM” MBSs.  
These are held in varying quantities by a large number of financial institu-
tions (“FIs”) worldwide, many of which do not yet appear to have fully re-
ported the sizes of their holdings.13  These securities, moreover, underlie 
financial derivative commitments on the part of yet more FIs worldwide, 
with notional values that similarly appear to be underreported.14  The 
MBSs, for their part, are now widely perceived to be “toxic” because 
many—though certainly not all and indeed not even a majority—of the 
mortgages backing them are troubled.15 
Many of the mentioned mortgages are troubled, in turn, because they 
were imprudently—or in some cases “predatorily”—extended by partici-
pants in the shadow industry of scarcely regulated “mortgage banks” that 
 
 13. See Hearing, supra note 3 (testimony of Henry J. Paulson, Jr., Secretary of the 
United States Treasury); see also CHARLES MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN:  
EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH (2008). 
 14. MORRIS, supra note 13, at 80-85. 
 15. To be more fine-grained, MBSs associated with a particular pool of mortgages are 
typically divided into three or more tranches.  See, e.g., id. at 73.  The largest tranch gener-
ally comprises the least risky, hence lowest return, stream of payments, often accounting for 
70% of a pool’s nominal value.  Id. at 39. The next tranch typically comprises a slightly 
more risky, hence slightly higher return, stream of payments, and accounts for 20% of the 
pool’s nominal value.  Id. at 40.  The final tranch, typically accounting for 10% of the pool’s 
nominal value, comprises the most risky, but also highest yield, stream of payments.  Id.  
This tranch is colorfully said to include the pool’s “toxic waste.”  Id. at 84.  The “toxic” 
MBSs are principally associated with this tranch of most pools.  But as I shall note further 
below, as confidence is lost, one tranch’s “toxicity” comes to taint the perception of other 
tranches as well. 
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developed and then grew in the vacuum left by those S&Ls lost in the 
1990s.16  These institutions, most of which are not, legally speaking, banks 
at all—they take no deposits and are not regulated as depository institu-
tions—proliferated rapidly with, and indeed helping to fuel, our recent Fed-
enabled real estate bubble.17  Naïve, non-credit-checked, and in some cases 
clearly uncreditworthy borrowers not only received loans from these insti-
tutions, but often were lured with offers of newfangled adjustable rate 
mortgages (“ARMs”) featuring low front-end “teaser” payments that later 
“ballooned.”18  Understanding how this could have happened will take us 
straight to the second, penumbral component of our present crisis, as well 
as to how to best solve it. 
Ordinarily, neither borrowers nor lenders would likely have expected 
anything good to come of loans on such terms.  But fees, risk-
transferability, and especially speculative asset bubbles have a funny way 
of changing people’s calculations.  Borrowers reasonably assume they can 
regularly refinance inexpensively on the strength of the underlying collat-
eral’s apparently inexorable appreciation.  Primary and secondary lenders 
naturally assume likewise.  Again, such assumptions seem normal while 
the bubble is growing.  Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan himself said 
as much at the time, saying the buyers would be irrational not to take up 
ARMs.19 
Borrowers, then, need not be profligate to “get in” what later proves “too 
deep” when it comes to levered asset purchases.  Lenders, for their part, 
need not be venal: they can reasonably endorse borrowers’ best hopes, even 
when lured by origination and loan servicing fees, and by the easy sale of 
 
 16. The network of S&Ls, fostered by President Hoover in the early 1930s to revitalize 
real estate markets and further developed by President Roosevelt thereafter to the same end, 
was done-in by the LBO-fueling junk bond craze of the later 1980s, which was in turn made 
possible by the Reagan administration’s and Congress’s elimination of previously tight 
regulation of S&L investment practices.  See Hockett, supra note 12, at 65, 106. 
 17. There seems to be growing consensus that the Federal Reserve kept lending rates too 
low in the early 2000s.  See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FLECKTENSTEIN WITH FREDERICK SHEEHAN, 
GREENSPAN’S BUBBLES:  THE AGE OF INNOCENCE AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE 145 (2008); 
MORRIS, supra note 13, at 65-66.  A charitable interpretation is that the Federal Reserve 
overshot in addressing the slowdowns first threatened by the Asian financial crisis and Rus-
sian debt default of the late 1990s, then occasioned by the deflation of the tech bubble in 
2000 and the 9/11 attacks of 2001.  There are, of course, less charitable interpretations. 
 18. See, e.g., ROBERT SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION:  HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008); see also MORRIS, supra 
note 13, at 68-69. 
 19. The allusion here is to Chairman Greenspan’s now notorious speech given in Febru-
ary of 2004.  See, e.g., Associated Press, Greenspan Says Personal Debt Is Mitigated by 
Housing Value, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at C11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/02/24/business/24fed.html?ex=1231131600&en=8882db4e0fc674da&ei=5070. 
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resultant mortgages to secondary holders.  The secondary holders only add 
to the pressure.  Often they prod loan originators on, as seems to have hap-
pened quite widely this time.  Why?  Perhaps partly because they assume 
the originators have done the due diligence.  But they are lured in any 
event, by the returns on investments that are there to be had while a bubble 
is inflating, even if there be defaults here and there.  The highest rewards 
are always associated with some risk, after all. 
For a time in these cases—often for years—virtually everyone wins.  
The process takes on a self-fulfillingly prophetic, spontaneous “chain let-
ter” or Ponzi-like character.  More are drawn into the market as prices keep 
rising.  Some hope to clear speculative profits by “flipping” the assets they 
borrow to buy.  Others, more innocently perhaps, reasonably judge they 
can prudently purchase to hold, but on more highly leveraged terms than 
they might otherwise have accepted.  Still others are mixed cases of holder-
cum-speculator.20  In any event, as the new entrants keep entering, the 
prices do keep rising, effectively validating the judgments of those who act 
upon the expectation of continued ascent. 
As this process continues, some begin to believe, and others perhaps la-
bor to convince themselves, that we have entered upon some permanent 
“new era,” from which point onward asset values quite generally “can only 
go up.”  Others, somewhat more modestly, convince themselves simply 
that the particular asset in question—land or petroleum, say—is in finite 
supply.  Since populations and long-term demand know no limits, they 
conclude—not implausibly—that this one “can only go up.”  Others, fi-
nally, remain fairly certain that all that goes up can come down.  However, 
they cannot know when the descent will begin; so they keep hanging on 
anxiously, day by day, in hopes of gleaning just that much more profit be-
fore exiting.  It is in each participant’s rational interest, after all, to ride to 
that asymptote, which is the very inflection point, so most keep on riding. 
Bubbles never grow indefinitely; the inflection point always is reached.  
The Ponzi growth rate slows at some point in the indefinite medium term, 
whatever the more definite, long-term trend-lines might be.21  When that 
 
 20. Those who borrow with a view to buying homes they will actually occupy often buy 
more expensive homes, for example, their down-payments often constituting smaller por-
tions of the total to be paid.  Others borrow with a view to purchasing homes they intend to 
“flip” at a profit.  Still others are actuated by motives that combine the first two, perhaps 
planning to continue residing in the home if appreciation rates slow, and to “flip” the home 
or “trade up” should appreciation continue apace.  See generally RICHARD BITNER, 
CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPRIME LENDER:  AN INSIDER’S TALE OF GREED, FRAUD, AND 
IGNORANCE (2008). 
 21. This seems the right place to trot out the inevitable quotation of Keynes, to the effect 
that “in the long run, we’re all dead.”  In the Long Run, the Dollar Is Dead, SEEKING ALPHA, 
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happens, the spontaneous Ponzi process abruptly halts and then quickly re-
verses.  The buildup of worry—”how long can this last?”—discharges at 
last.  A “Minsky Moment” is reached.22  Many erstwhile winners, having 
been nervously mindful all along that a peak followed by mass exit must at 
some point be reached, seek to salvage gains or cut losses by being first to 
jump ship.  “Sauve qui peut,” “Die Letzen beissen die Hunde,” or “Devil 
take the hindmost,” as used to be said on the French, German, and English 
markets, respectively.23  But in modern, electronically traded markets, the 
time-span between first and last is paper-thin.  Prices plunge very quickly, 
and with them the reliability of those repayment obligations associated with 
the credit-extensions that fueled the rise. 
This is the fate that befell our own housing bubble quite recently.24  
Prices leveled off, then began falling in mid-2006.25  The ensuing slump 
quickly began to throw ill-structured, bubble-time mortgages into default, 
as market valuations of underlying assets began falling below nominal debt 
obligations.26  Default rates, not surprisingly, have since grown steadily.27  
As they have grown, the market values of mortgages, mortgage-backed se-
curities, and associated derivative obligations have dropped yet further.28  
In effect, the same feedback loop structure that characterized the buildup 
now characterizes the comedown. 
The second, penumbral component of our mortgage-rooted financial cri-
sis accordingly is, no pun intended, derivative.  It is mass-psychological, 
simply the flipside of the just described Ponzi process: a proverbial “market 
for lemons” of the sort known to macroeconomists since at least the time of 
 
Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.seekingalpha.com/article/110849-in-the-long-run-the-dollar-is-
dead.  We might also liken things here to a sort of reversal of Al Gore’s frequent observa-
tion that this year’s being cooler than last year constitutes no refutation of long-term global 
warming.  AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006).  The trend-line’s sloping 
upward over the long haul does not prevent its being jagged over long enough periods to be 
either misleading (in the case of climate change skeptics) or devastating (in the case of in-
vestment naifs). 
 22. HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986) (using the phrase 
“Minksy Moment” to describe the turbulent U.S. economy).  This work seems, unsurpris-
ingly, to be enjoying a bit of a rediscovery. 
 23. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:  A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 32, 48 (5th ed. 2005). 
 24. E.g., MORRIS, supra note 13, at 71; SHILLER, supra note 18. 
 25. SeeSHILLER, supra note 18. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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Akerlof’s and Stiglitz’s canonical articles of the early 1970s29 (for which 
both won Nobels), and to financiers since Gresham30 first postulated the 
“Law” bearing his name, follows many a burst bubble.  The prevailing 
mood changes, tendencies become increasingly risk-averse, and uncertain-
ties  are resolved by assuming the worst. 
In the present iteration of this depressingly familiar story, no institutions 
or persons know precisely what portions of their own MBS-holdings will 
prove “underperforming” in consequence of the mortgage industry’s post-
crash troubles.31  That is partly because no one knows precisely which 
mortgages will foreclose, and thus, which, or by how much, securities will 
underperform.  It is partly because no one knows how low particular prop-
erty values, or property values more generally, will fall.  Finally, it is partly 
because property values, hence mortgage and MBS values, are themselves 
partly determined by whatever action we collectively take or do not take to 
prevent defaults.32  There is a significant element of self-fulfilling prophecy 
in whatever we do here, just as there was a self-fulfilling prophecy in the 
growth of the Ponzi-like bubble itself.  Until action on the part of the col-
lective is taken by some agent authorized to act in the name of all, each 
private party assumes the worst and seeks exit. 
This self-fulfilling prophecy steadily radiates outward: the market grows 
ever more jittery over the just enumerated uncertainties.  The longer these 
jitters endure, the more prone investors become to undervalue affected fi-
nancial institutions’ MBS-including portfolios, and ultimately those institu-
tions’ own issuances.  The more these investors shed their stakes in these 
institutions, in turn, the more quickly the remaining such stakes lose their 
short-run values.  In effect, there is a “run on the banks,” in this case by 
shareholders rather than depositors—as used to happened before there was 
federal deposit insurance.33  The negative feedback loop found in the mar-
 
 29. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Ration-
ing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. ASS’N 393 (1981). 
 30. Sir Thomas Gresham, an English financier who lived between 1519–1579, is cred-
ited with the expression of the principle that “bad money drives out good money.”  Essen-
tially, where two versions of coin that have very different actual market values are artifi-
cially forced (by law or regulation, for example) to have the same value, consumers will 
generally purchase with the coinage of lesser actual value while retaining the more valuable 
coins.  See Wikipedia.org, Gresham’s Law, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gresham’s_Law 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
 31. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 13. 
 32. This is a claim I am making, not an authority to which I am citing.  Improved de-
mand for assets pushes values up, lack of demand keeps or pushes them down. 
 33. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 23, at 28; see also JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 184 (1954). 
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ket for MBSs accordingly spreads beyond those securities.  The familiar 
financial “contagion” ensues. 
The process is aided by mark-to-market accounting rules that require in-
stitutions to value their assets as the market values them34—even when, 
thanks to the panic psychology at work, the market arguably is grossly un-
dervaluing them.  With affected institutions interlinked by collateralized 
debt obligations, credit-default swaps, and other derivative risk-sharing ar-
rangements, even those not holding MBSs end up affected.  The “down-
ward spiral” winds steadily downward. 
But what goes down can be turned back up, and brought to a much more 
sustainable stratum.  Enter here the FHA and its GSE siblings: we can 
quickly reverse the widening downward spiral that is this crisis’s penum-
bral component, as the Treasury’s original late September 2008 plan itself 
contemplated, by directly addressing the cause at its core—the bad mort-
gages and the securities they back.  This is precisely what the FHA and its 
newly renationalized GSEs originally were and are for.  Let us then look, 
for a moment, a bit further back than the heady early and dismal later 
2000s, to the heady mid-1920s and dismal later 1930s. 
II.  WHERE WE WERE AND HOW WE GOT THERE 
Public memory of the era immediately preceding the New Deal features 
three gaps that we would do well now to fill.  One such forgotten fact is 
that before there was a “Second World War,” the “First World War” was 
called “The Great War.”  The second forgotten fact is that the 1929 stock 
market “crash”—commonly singled out as having initiated that Depression 
which, thank goodness, we still can call “The Great”—was but a stage in a 
longer-term decline.  It was immediately preceded, moreover, by a crash in 
the real estate market—most notably perhaps that in Florida, in which none 
other than Charles Ponzi himself had loomed large.35 
Finally, the third fact that we have forgotten is that the system of home 
mortgage finance that has made America “a nation of home-owners” and 
introduced the financial innovation known as “securitization” itself, was 
actually designed, and then instituted over the course of the 1930s and 
1940s, precisely in response to the just mentioned real estate crisis.36  Be-
 
 34. See, e.g., Brooke Sopelsa, Former FDIC Chair Blames SEC for Credit Crunch, 
CBNC, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/27100454. 
 35. FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY:  AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 
NINETEEN-TWENTIES (1931) (proving a good example of this story). 
 36. See, e.g., J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Federal Policy: Encouraging 
Homeownership, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS:  PAST AND PRESENT 39, 41-
42 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1986); see also D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL 
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fore that time, fewer than 50% of American families owned their own 
homes; since that time, upwards of 60% have come to enjoy that status.37  
Where homes are concerned, in other words, the “ownership society” is a 
New Deal invention.  That society, however, is now under threat—as are, 
consequently, the world’s financial systems—just as they were in the early 
1930s. 
It is a thus matter of some urgency, rather than mere antiquarian interest, 
to recollect this history, as well as to see how our present problems take 
root in our having forgotten and departed from it.  We must act quickly to 
ensure that the Great Depression remains “Great,” rather than becoming 
just “I.” 
Early in the twentieth century, as now, most who purchased residential 
real estate did so at least partly on credit.38  What was different then was 
that fewer purchased housing at all, for that very reason.  Housing credit 
markets were more fragmented and mortgages, in consequence, were much 
less liquid investments than they have since become.  Home loans, in con-
sequence, were extended for much briefer terms—generally two to three 
years—at the end of which they would “balloon” to come due in full.39 
Loan-to-value ratios before the 1930s, in turn, were very low by modern 
standards.40  As little as 50% was considered high, and was rare.41  Financ-
ing on such terms, not surprisingly, fell short of most would-be buyers’ ca-
pacities.  As a result, second mortgages, junior liens, and rollover refinanc-
ings were the norm.  This was not terribly problematic for those who dared 
to buy, so long as real estate values continued to rise, as they did—very 
rapidly—through most of the 1920s.  Refinancing then, as more recently, 
was not difficult when the value of one’s collateral—the home itself—
continued to rise in the real estate boom of the 1920s. 
When real estate prices leveled off and then began falling in 1928, how-
ever, short-term mortgages no longer could be refinanced in full—again, 
things were much as they are today.  Resultant forced sales and foreclo-
sures, which reached the rate of over 1000 per day once some 50% of all 
home mortgages in the country had gone into default, brought prices stead-
 
MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS 2-25 (1989); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:  THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 203 ff. (1988).  See generally Hockett, supra note 
12. 
 37. See Hockett, supra note 12, at 116. 
 38. Id. at 105. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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ily lower.42  The real estate market fell into the familiar “downward spi-
ral.”43  The parallel with today could not be more striking. 
For then as today, the crisis that afflicted the real estate market spread 
much more widely, ultimately reaching the stock market itself.  The rea-
sons were obvious.  First, substantial portions of the American labor force 
were employed either in the home-building industry itself or in industries 
that were bound to lose business as home-builders went out of business.44  
Second, disemployed labor, like fearful and foreclosed mortgagees them-
selves, spent less money, feeding further contraction.45  The vortex of con-
traction, recession, and then depression was complete. 
The programs instituted to address this widening real-estate-rooted cri-
sis—begun in the last year of the Hoover administration, broadened 
through the Roosevelt years, and continued in minimally altered form to-
day—cannot fail to impress in their innovativeness and comprehensiveness.  
The process began with the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (“FHLBA”) of 
1932,46 which authorized establishment of a system of Regional Federal 
Home Loan Banks, roughly parallel to that of the Federal Reserve’s system 
of Regional Federal Reserve Banks.47  The Regional Banks provided stan-
dards and supervision to member institutions—the private mutual savings 
banks (“MSBs”) then responsible for most mortgage lending—and in re-
turn supplied added lines of credit on the security of mortgage loans that 
they held (in effect “monetizing” those mortgages).48 
The new Congress that took office in 1933 built upon Hoover’s well de-
signed initiative.  It did so first with the Home Owners’ Loan Act 
(“HOLA”) in 1933,49 which temporarily established a Home Owners Loan 
Corporation (“HOLC”) for refinancing foreclosed loans on favorable terms 
to enable erstwhile home-owners to recover their homes.50  It also laid the 
groundwork for a steady spread of more MSBs, by directly affording na-
tional charters even where state authorities might have barred entry.51 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 41; see also Hockett, supra note 12, at 105. 
 44. See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 42 (noting that construction workers “constituted a 
substantial portion of every local labor force”). 
 45. Hockett, supra note 12, at 127. 
 46. ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 
(2006)). 
 47. See Hockett, supra note 12, at 106. 
 48. Id. 
 49. ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (2006)). 
 50. Hockett, supra note 12, at 107. 
 51. Id. at 108. 
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One year later, the National Housing Act (“NHA”) of 193452 afforded a 
system of deposit insurance for the MSBs analogous to that newly insti-
tuted for depositors in commercial banks, further boosting the availability 
of lendable deposits.53  More critically, the NHA instituted a system of in-
surance for the MSBs themselves, against defaulting mortgagors: Section 
203 of the NHA established a nationwide “mutual mortgage insurance sys-
tem” through which a newly created, and now permanent, Federal Housing 
Administration (“FHA”) could insure first mortgage loans made for the 
construction, purchase, or refinancing of one- to four-bedroom family 
homes.54  In effect, FHA took over and discharged indefinitely the func-
tions of the HOLC, which from its inception had been conceived as ad hoc 
and temporary. 
FHA still operates today, guaranteeing and, in many cases, originating or 
refinancing mortgages that conform to the standards that it imposes (so-
called “conforming” mortgages).  It also affords financial counseling to 
borrowers.55  And it does all of this at no cost to the public fisc—the only 
federal agency to do so.56 
The FHA and its insurance scheme fundamentally altered the regime of 
home-financing in the United States.  It effectively replaced traditional col-
lateralization requirements with national default-risk-pooling, rendering 
home loans more affordable.  The uniform requirements upon which the 
FHA conditioned its insurance, for its part, fostered the development of a 
standardized home mortgage instrument marketable throughout the coun-
try: the familiar thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage so common to low-end 
mortgage finance until recently.57  This in turn opened the door to securiti-
zation, and hence, yet more complete risk-pooling.  The housing quality re-
quirements upon which FHA conditioned its insurance also ensured the fi-
nancial rationality of federally facilitated home-finance investments.58  
Further, FHA’s requirements of (a) actuarial soundness and (b) risk classi-
fying and separate pooling ensured that the system retained the traditional 
efficiencies of a private insurance market.  That is why it still operates in 
the black. 
 
 52. ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
 53. Hockett, supra note 12, at 109. 
 54. Id. at 110. 
 55. Id. at 92. 
 56. See id. at 93. 
 57. See id. at 108. 
 58. Id. at 112. 
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Congress effectively completed its ad hoc discovery of our now familiar 
method of financially engineered home-ownership-spreading in 1938, by 
chartering the first modern “government sponsored enterprise” (“GSE”): 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) or “Fannie Mae.”59  
Fannie Mae was charged with making a national market in FHA-insured 
mortgage instruments themselves, in other words, with “securitizing” those 
mortgages.60  In effect, Fannie Mae, along with later progeny (in particular 
Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac, to say nothing of the higher education loan 
securitizers like Sallie Mae, expressly patterned after the Fannie Mae 
model), closed the proverbial circle, separately completing the markets for 
housing credit and credit-risk-bearing, thereby optimizing the availability 
of such credit to home-buyers in the manner described earlier.61 
Fannie Mae proved sufficiently successful, even on market terms, to pri-
vatize in 1968.62  Freddie Mac for its part, was instituted in 1970 specifi-
cally in order to compete with the newly privatized and gargantuan Fan-
nie.63  Both Fannie and Freddie subsequently came to offer a multitude of 
home finance services, and operated effectively, as well as profitably, in 
spreading home-ownership until recently.64 
What, then, went wrong?  In essence, the story is just that told in the 
previous section, albeit now with an added wrinkle: on the one hand, Fan-
nie and Freddie were caught up in bubble psychology just like so many 
others.  It was very profitable to buy ever more risky, non-FHA-
conforming mortgages so long as property values kept growing at the rates 
that they grew in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Global investors in Fan-
nie and Freddie, including many a large sovereign wealth fund or treasury, 
insisted these profits be sought.65 
At the same time, in view of their original missions as engines of the 
American home-ownership society, members of Congress and other offi-
cials during the Clinton and Bush years alike—themselves evidently caught 
up in the belief that real estate “could only go up”—in some cases actively 
pressured the old GSEs to take on more risky mortgages.66  Why not pursue 
the original salutary mission all the more aggressively, after all, if even the 
Federal Reserve Chairman was convinced that real estate would just keep 
 
 59. Id. at 113. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 114. 
 62. See id.  Sallie Mae did so in late 2004.  Id. at 150. 
 63. Id. at 113-14. 
 64. See Fannie Mae Homepage, http://www.fanniemae.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). 
 65. See MORRIS, supra note 13, at 38. 
 66. Id. 
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rising in value?  Finally, in view of Fannie’s governmental lineage, Fan-
nie’s and Freddie’s “implicit” federal guarantees,67 and both institutions’ 
associated “too big to fail” status,68 Fannie and Freddie were all the more 
able to attract plenty of purchasers of their securities. 
Ultimately, of course, all of this landed Fannie and Freddie in very hot 
water.  The real estate slump that commenced in the summer of 2006 hit 
them especially hard, for they held the great bulk of low end mortgages.  
We know where it led: Fannie and Freddie were ultimately renationalized 
in September 2008.69  Many took this for an ominous sign, on all fours with 
the totterings of Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, AIG, and Washington Mutual, among others.  What we ought really 
to see in the renationalization of Fannie and Freddie, however, is opportu-
nity—an opportunity for the restoration of home values, home-owning, and 
finance. 
III.  BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME 
With FHA still in operation as the sole federal agency that operates at no 
cost to the public fisc, and with its prodigal siblings now back in the fam-
ily, we are actually very well situated to address the mortgage crisis at the 
core of our imminent global financial crisis.  Indeed we can easily set the 
team to work in a manner a lot like the manner in which it operated in solv-
ing that real estate crisis which prompted its founding in the first place.  
Here is how to do it. 
First, through the now newly refederalized GSEs, employ TARP moneys 
to purchase and repurchase perceivedly “troubled” MBSs from key finan-
cial institutions now holding them as originally envisaged by Treasury, 
adding them to the large numbers of such securities already held by the 
GSEs.  Pay more than currently undervalued market, but lower than dis-
counted cashflow value.  That way value will be recouped as MBSs rise 
back to less panic-depressed values.  This will also ensure that financial in-
stitutions that over-invested in MBSs incur some cost, thereby mitigating 
the moral hazard concerns occasioned by any bailout: in effect, we will be 
taking a “deductible,” or conferring the attributes of “coinsurance” on the 
bailout. 
 
 67. E.g., id. 
 68. Id.; see, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Too Big to Fail?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at 
WK1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/weekinreview/20goodman.html. 
 69. Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, Statement on 
Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and 
Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm. 
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How much more than currently undervalued market, but lower than dis-
counted cashflow value, should we pay out?  Many methods have been 
proposed, best known among them is probably the “reverse auction” first 
proposed by the Treasury in September of 2008.70  Reverse auctioning cer-
tainly seems the most efficient means of dividing the surplus that we will 
be recouping.  We shall do best to prescind here from fine-tuned account-
ing and valuation matters, however, as there is surely a range of reasonable 
possibilities within which to choose.  What matters for the present is that 
MBSs are certainly presently undervalued by a spooked market, for the 
same psychological reasons that they were overvalued by our erstwhile 
euphoric market.71  This fact itself—if there is more or less symmetry be-
tween first the euphoric and then the dejected “animal spirits” that have 
been at work in the MBS market this decade—suggests somewhere near 
the mean between peak and trough rates as a good working benchmark 
against which to check observed auction rates, perhaps marginally adjusted 
in recognition of any asymmetry thought to be worked by endowment or 
related effects. 
Will the MBSs rise back to higher values?  Yes, for reasons rooted in the 
“market for lemons” and “self-fulfilling prophecy” phenomena noted 
above.  The problem in this case is that, while we know that only a small 
minority of mortgages will actually default and only a minority of MBSs 
will actually prove to be “toxic,” we don’t know which ones.  During peri-
ods of irrational despair that follow periods of irrational exuberance, indi-
viduals irrationally fear that they are holding the underperforming invest-
ments disproportionately.  Let us call it a “reverse Wobegon” problem.  
Each individual worries, “I might have only the bad ones.”72  Fearing this 
individually, such investors then, in effect, collectively make it so by stam-
peding to sell what they irrationally undervalue.  In short, this is a classic 
collective action problem, one that, in this case, artificially deflates value. 
Concentrate ownership of the full affected portfolio, then, and the collec-
tive action problem is addressed head-on and entirely solved.  Each secu-
 
 70. Posting of Ed Bockman to Supply Excellence, http://www.supplyexcellence.com/ 
blog/2008/09/29/bailout-reverse-auctions (Sept. 29, 2008); Posting of Phil Izzo to Real 
Time Economics, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/09/23/how-will-troubled-assets-get-
priced (Sept. 23, 2008, 17:21 EST); Posting of Ronald P. O’Hanley & Charles. J. Jacklin to 
Financial Times Economists’ Forum, http://blogs.ft.com/wolfforum/2008/09/can-wash 
ington-%E2%80%93-and-a-reverse-auction-%E2%80%93-save-the-markets-and-protect-
the-taxpayer (Sept. 26, 2008, 17:09 EST). 
 71. See Akerlof, supra note 29, at 490. 
 72. This allusion is to Garrison Keillor’s proverbial town of Lake Wobegon, where “all 
of the children are above average.”  A Prairie Home Companion from American Public Me-
dia:  Podcasts, http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/about/podcast/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
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rity can effectively be valued at the mean, without the need to know which 
particular securities in fact possess more or less than mean value.  The 
problem of investors all fearing that they hold securities that are of less 
than mean value—the “reverse Wobegon problem”—is immediately 
solved.  We restore full portfolio value, in short, precisely by concentrating 
ownership of the full portfolio, booking the difference between that portfo-
lio and the current irrationally depressed market value of the previously 
dispersed securities.  Concentrating ownership also will facilitate smooth 
operation of the second part of the FHA/GSE plan that I propose, the part 
that restores value to underlying mortgages themselves. 
The second and complementary part of the plan is, through the FHA, si-
multaneously to arrange refinancing and financial counseling for those 
mortgagees who, owing to poorly structured or misleadingly packaged 
mortgages, are now going under.  Make a priority of first-time single-
home-buyers who have purchased the homes to occupy them, and who 
might realistically pay for them if only their payment structures are 
smoothed.  Show less solicitude for “second” or “nth” homes that clearly 
are speculative properties purchased for “flipping,” unless there is a good 
chance of saving foreclosure costs by refinancing.  The FHA should show 
intermediate solicitude for those who, though not strictly speculators, have 
nonetheless grossly overreached, helping to refinance some while gradual-
izing workouts and foreclosures on others.  The FHA is quite experienced 
with all of these options. 
Note that all of this can be done at a reasonable, unforced pace once the 
FHA’s sibling GSEs have purchased or repurchased the great bulk of 
MBSs per the first part of the plan.  The newly renationalized GSEs do not 
face the same short-term financial imperatives as private lenders, for they 
are once again effectively public agencies.  Nor do they face the bargaining 
problems that confront dispersed classes of creditors in more garden variety 
insolvency situations, for in purchasing up MBSs they will concentrate 
ownership of those assets.  Debt workouts too are familiarly a collective 
action problem, as any bankruptcy expert will readily attest.73  This, then, is 
yet another benefit of concentrating ownership of these now troubled assets 
in the hands of our GSEs.  It will enhance the value of the assets them-
selves, precisely by preventing massive foreclosures and their associated 
costs, and thus preserving the value of those mortgages that underlie the 
presently “toxic” MBSs. 
 
 73. See, e.g., Posting of Bob Rasmussen to The University of Chicago Faculty Blog:  
Hedge Funds and Collective Action, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/06/hedge 
_funds_and.html (June 1, 2006 14:51 CST). 
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It bears mentioning that the FHA can effect mortgage refinancings much 
more efficiently than judges or any new cadre of bankruptcy trustees of the 
sort some are proposing would do.  This efficiency will result because refi-
nancing is already an FHA specialty and the GSEs’ repurchasing of MBSs 
will eliminate the usual holdout problems that afflict ordinary debt work-
outs in the vicinity of court-administered bankruptcy.  This renders the 
paired FHA/GSE plan superior, moreover, to Professor Shiller’s proposal 
for a new HOLC.74  Professor Shiller’s proposal would merely recreate an 
agency that the FHA was itself instituted to replace and make it permanent.  
His plan also would not yield the concentrated MBS-ownership advantages 
that this plan involves. 
Offer to buy troubled MBSs, then, and most who hold them now will 
likely sell.  Then the FHA can refinance mortgages with speed—deliberate 
speed—without pressure.  As for any investors who do not sell their MBSs 
within the plan, note first that they would have to constitute one third of the 
mortgage credit outstanding on any one home if they wished to block its 
refinancing under the Bankruptcy Code, and might very well find them-
selves subject to a “cram down” by the Bankruptcy judge in a proceeding 
in any event.75  It seems unlikely, against that backdrop, that there would 
be sufficient “holdout” power to impede refinancing.  Further, if there ex-
isted such a bloc of investors that sought to obstruct refinancing arrange-
ments by FHA, there may be sufficient ground for the government to exer-
cise its eminent domain power and pay the amount paid to the last—or 
even the first—voluntary sellers of MBSs to the holdouts.  A securities 
covenant is no more a suicide pact than is the Constitution, and there is no 
reason to honor exploitative holdout power in times of exigency.  If any-
thing, there is reason to shame holdouts publicly, along with the worst of 
 
 74. See SHILLER, supra note 18 (putting forth this proposal).  A similar plan, proposed 
by Congressman Frank and Senator Dodd, was put forth in 2007, but withdrawn in the face 
of opposition by industry groups, Republicans in Congress, and the now out-of-office Bush 
administration.  The Dodd/Frank plan would have employed FHA, but, proposed as it was 
before Fannie and Freddie had been renationalized, did not involve GSE’s sweeping trou-
bled MBSs from the market.  Now that we have the full team together again, prospects look 
better. 
 75. Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter K. Newman ed., 1998); Letter from The Am. Bankers As-
s’n et al. to the Honorable John Conyers and the Honorable Lamar Smith (Jan. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ltr012709.pdf; Business Debt Re-
structuring Still Available Through Chapter 11, BANKR. PROTECTOR, Mar. 2008, 
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bankruptcy/ (Jan. 14, 2009). 
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that comparative minority of borrowers and lenders who were grossly neg-
ligent in the midst of the bubble. 
So how much will all of this cost?  That is difficult to determine in view 
of the feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies at work in the present crisis.  
The best that can be expected is to recognize the range of reasonably an-
ticipated possibilities.  At one end of this range is the possibility that FHA 
and its renationalized GSE siblings will actually emerge from this crisis in 
the black.  Certainly that is what happened from the late 1930s onward, 
when the original package was first implemented.  Indeed, it is why Fannie 
Mae was ultimately privatized, and it is why the FHA has operated at a 
profit since its inception.  It should also be noted that Messrs. Bernanke, 
Bush, and Paulson argued that the TARP, even without the salvaging of 
mortgage—hence MBS—values that refinancing can accomplish, could re-
sult in a net gain to the fisc. 
What about the less rosy end of the range of possibilities?  That one is 
just a bit harder to estimate.  This owes in part to the aforementioned feed-
back-effect-rooted indeterminacies.  It owes also to the countervailing ef-
fects of the aforementioned MBS-appreciation apt to be wrought by con-
centrated ownership on the one hand, and the MBS-depreciation apt to be 
wrought by continued home-value-decline and foreclosures on the other 
hand.  The worst-case scenario would be that the full amount spent pur-
chasing troubled MBSs would be lost.  At present, under the TARP, that 
would be about $350 billion—the remaining amount now available—plus 
what ever increment of the first half of funds the Treasury has already spent 
upon MBSs.  This worst-case scenario seems far from plausible, for all of 
the reasons mentioned above. 
CONCLUSION 
To our detriment, we have long since forgotten how effective the FHA 
and its GSE siblings were, upon their foundings during the Roosevelt era, 
in ending our last mortgage “meltdown.”  At literally no ultimate cost to 
the public fisc—none—they cured that real estate crisis, and in so doing 
transformed us from a nation in which fewer than 40% of the population 
owned their homes, to a nation in which 70% do. 
Since the FHA is both self-funding and the best mortgage financing or-
ganization, and since the GSEs have now been refederalized in keeping 
with their original, pre-privatization mandates, their complementary origi-
nal missions can now be restored.  The FHA and GSE mandates are clear, 
constitutional, and can still be accomplished at nearly no cost.  They exist 
to spread and maintain non-speculative home-ownership on Main Street.  
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Set them to work on that now and we will save Wall Street—and the global 
financial system—as well, at least until the next bubble. 
